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The Spectre of Star Chamber: The
Role of an Ancient English Tribunal
in the Supreme Court's Self-
Incrimination Jurisprudence
by FRANK RIEBLI*
In 1641, the English Parliament passed an act abolishing the
High Court of Star Chamber,' a royal prerogative court whose exis-
tence can be traced to the mid-14th century Star Chamber should
have faded into obscurity;' in 1719, a report to Parliament indicated
that the complete set of official records of Star Chamber's proceed-
ings was missing.' Yet our own Supreme Court has resurrected Star
Chamber, alluding to the ancient English court in its opinions over 75
*Law clerk to Hon. Joseph T. Sneed, III, United States Court of Appeals for the.Ninth
Circuit; University of California Hastings College of the Law, J.D. summa cum laude,
2002; Columbia University, M.A., 1996; University of California at San Diego, B.A., 1993.
The author wishes to thank Geoffrey Hansen, whose two questions: "Does the Supreme
Court know what the Star Chamber is? Does anyone?" served as the impetus for this pa-
per, and Leny Riebli for her help and support throughout the (interminable) writing proc-
ess.
1. 16 Car. 1, c. 10 (July 5, 1641) (Eng.).
2. See CORA LOUISE SCOFIELD, A STUDY OF THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER iii
(Burt Franklin ed., 1969) (1900) (finding references to Star Chamber as early as 1356);
William Hudson, A Treatise of the Court of Star Chamber, in COLLECTANEA JURIDICA, 1-
241 (Francis Hargrave ed., 1.980) (1792) (stating that Star Chamber dates from the Twelfth
Century reign of Henry II). Hudson's treatise is circa 1600.
3. Star Chamber was not well understood in its own time. It is not even clear that
the name "Star Chamber" always referred to the same thing. Some theories suggest that
the name referred to a particular room in which one or different bodies sat. SCOFIELD,
supra note 2, at iii. Another theory suggests that the name referred to a particular body.
William Hudson, a practitioner in Star Chamber, suggests a metaphor of the King as the
Sun and the judges as the stars reflecting the King's light. Hudson, supra note 2, at 8.
4. SELECT CASES BEFORE THE KING'S COUNCIL IN THE STAR CHAMBER xi (I.S.
Leadam ed., Selden Society 1903) [hereinafter Selden Society].
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times in the past two hundred years. It has alluded to Star Chamber
thirteen times since 1980, and most recently in 2002.' The goal of this
Note is to answer two simple questions: what does the Supreme Court
find so compelling about Star Chamber, and are its attributions accu-
rate?
Star Chamber was an institution with many functions. Though
primarily a judicial body where the King himself, at least in theory,
presided, Star Chamber was also used as a forum for announcing
royal decrees and greeting foreign dignitaries. Star Chamber derived
its judicial authority directly from the King; in post-Conquest Eng-
land, the King was the fount of all judicial authority.6 Accordingly,
the King and his advisors (later known as the King's Council) were
the ultimate arbiters in any legal dispute. Star Chamber emerged
from the Council, first as the Council's judicial manifestation, and
later as a distinct judicial body.7 Yet even as Star Chamber developed
its own institutional identity, it remained a part of the Council and
thus closely identified with the monarchy.8 Accordingly, it laid claim
to the Council's unbounded jurisdiction.9 Star Chamber could and
did preside over almost every type of lawsuit except felony prosecu-
tions."
At first glance, it is difficult to tell what the Court is up to when it
drags Star Chamber out of the closet. The Supreme Court has only
twice devoted more than a few sentences to Star Chamber.1 Often,
the allusion appears in text taken from an earlier opinion that refer-
ences Star Chamber.2 On at least three occasions, both the majority
and dissent have invoked Star Chamber's image, yet neither side has
5. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 56; 122 S. Ct. 2017, 2037 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
6. Hudson states that "all the courts of justice have flowed out of this court, as out of
a fountain; the king and his council having distributed these causes to substantial judges
for the ease of the subjects and themselves." Hudson, supra note 2, at 10. From the King
in Council grew the common law and chancery courts, the parliament and the great offices
of state. MICHAEL STUCKEY, THE HIGH COURT OF STAR CHAMBER 6 (1998).
7. SCOFIELD, supra note 2, at 37.
8. Id. at 40.
9. Id. at 16-24.
10. Id.
11. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-60 (1966); Ullmann v. United States,
350 U.S. 422, 446-47 (1956).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35 n.8 (2000) (quoting Doe v.
United States, 487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988)); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 595 (1990)
(quoting the same passage in Doe).
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commented on the other's allusion. 3 This all suggests an almost re-
flexive use of Star Chamber, as if a reference to the ancient English
court satisfies an urge to imbue certain principles with historical
meaning and permanence.
On the other hand, the Court has consistently used Star Cham-
ber to develop identifiable themes: brutality, abuse of power, oppres-
sive state might overpowering the helpless individual, and persecu-
tion. Star Chamber is usually a foil, contrasted with our own courts
and legal system, by adjectives like "hated," "obnoxious," and "op-
probrious." The Court has said, for example, that it "thought the
privilege [against self-incrimination] necessary to prevent any recur-
rence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their
stark brutality."'4 The Court has also referenced Star Chamber in ex-
plaining or justifying the scope of the protections it finds under the
Self-Incrimination Clause. The Court stated, for example, that "[t]he
importance of a right does not, by itself, determine its scope, and
therefore we must continue to hark back to the historical origins of
the privilege, particularly the evils at which it was to strike. The
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was developed by
painful opposition to ... Star Chamber proceedings."'
This Note will examine the role Star Chamber plays in the Su-
preme Court's self-incrimination jurisprudence. It is in this area that
Star Chamber references appear most often and in which they have
appeared most recently. Section II will analyze of three specific
themes in the Court's self-incrimination jurisprudence. Section II-A
will examine Star Chamber as a symbol of brutality, and conclude
that Star Chamber is wholly unremarkable-relative to other courts
of its time-in its use of physical abuse. Thus, while our Court's allu-
sions to Star Chamber in this context are not inaccurate, the reference
to an ancient and obscure English court adds little that a reference to
our own colonial courts could not provide. Section I1-B will examine
Star Chamber's role in illuminating the "testimonial evidence" doc-
trine, and conclude that allusions to Star Chamber here are inappro-
priate. In this context, Star Chamber adds nothing to the Court's ju-
risprudence and in fact, reveals the Court's own misunderstanding of
Star Chamber. Finally, Section Il-C will examine Star Chamber as a
symbol of political and religious persecution and conclude that in this
13. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 212, 220 (1988); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 327, 338 (1973); Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 422, 428, 446.
14. Couch, 409 U.S. at 327 (quoting Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 428).
15. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,439-40 (1974).
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context, Star Chamber is a vital and powerful image.
II.
Star Chamber appears in the Court's self-incrimination jurispru-
dence in three ways. It appears as a symbol of brutality in cases in-
volving the voluntariness of a confession under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court also treats it as the historical impetus for the
testimonial evidence doctrine and uses Star Chamber to delineate the
doctrine's scope. Finally, Star Chamber occasionally appears as a
symbol of persecution when the Court (or a dissenting minority) at-
tempts to enlist the Fifth Amendment as an auxiliary to the First
Amendment. This section considers each in turn.
A.
The Court uses Star Chamber to illustrate the basic tension that
animates its decisions on the voluntariness of confessions. On the one
hand, the Court acknowledges that the State has a basic interest in se-
curity, and that in service of that interest, the police must be permit-
ted to question persons suspected of wrongdoing with the aim of elic-
iting incriminating information and solving crimes.16 On the other,
there is the "basic notion that the terrible engine of the criminal law is
not to be used to overreach individuals who stand helpless against
it."" The police may question people suspected of crimes, but may
not torture or otherwise brutalize them in order to extract informa-
tion."
In an effort to strike a balance between these competing inter-
ests, the Court has held that the police may elicit confessions so long
as the suspect confesses voluntarily. 9 Involuntary confessions are in-
admissible." Voluntariness, which is a fact-driven question, thus be-
comes the inquiry in each case.2' "A statement to be voluntary of
course need not be volunteered. But if it is the product of sustained
pressure by the police it does not issue from a free choice."22 To the
16. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 577-78 (1961).
17. Id. at 581.
18. Id.
19. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 54. The compulsion inherent in police questioning also provided the impe-
tus for the Court's holding in Miranda that the police must warn a suspect of his right to
silence before initiating a custodial interrogation. 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
22. Watts, 338 U.S. at 53.
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extent that the police extract a confession with fists, ropes, rubber
hoses or psychological pressures, it is involuntary and inadmissible.23
The Court uses Star Chamber to illustrate this latter extreme: inas-
much as the police extract a confession in the manner that confessions
were extracted in Star Chamber, it is pried from the defendant against
his will and is offensive to Due Process.24
The Court invoked Star Chamber, for example, in its decision
holding inadmissible a confession obtained through torture in Brown
v. Mississippi.2 In Brown, a mob seized one of the defendants and
accused him of having committed a murder.26 When the defendant
denied any involvement, the mob, with the participation of a deputy
sheriff, hanged the defendant, cut him down, hanged him a second
time and then whipped him. Still, he refused to confess and was re-
leased.2 ' A day or two later, the deputy and another sheriff appeared
at the defendant's home, arrested him and took him into Alabama.29
There the deputy repeatedly whipped the defendant and told him the
whipping would continue until he confessed.30 The defendant con-
fessed and was prosecuted for the murder. The rope marks on
Brown's neck were "plainly visible" at his trial two days later.32 He
was convicted and sentenced to death on no other evidence than the
confession the two deputies elicited while whipping him.33
Describing the trial transcript as "more like pages torn from
some medieval account, than a record made within the confines of a
modern civilization which aspires to an enlightened constitutional
government," the Court reversed the convictions in Brown, holding
that the conditions under which the deputies had obtained the defen-
dant's confession denied him Due Process.34 Such "revolting" meth-
ods, the Court declared, were "the chief iniquity, the crowning infamy
23. Id.; Culombe, 367 U.S. at 575.
24. E.g., Culombe, 367 U.S. at 581-82 (comparing modern police brutality to the tor-
ture practiced in Star Chamber).
25. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).




30. Id. at 282.
31. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 282 (1936).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 281.
34. Id. at 282 (quoting Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 470-71 (Miss. 1935) (Griffith, J.,
dissenting)).
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of the Star Chamber.
3 5
The Court has also alluded to Star Chamber in decisions invali-
dating convictions based on confessions obtained through psychologi-
cal coercion. "There is torture of mind as well as body; the will is as
much affected by fear as by force."36 Thus, in Watts v. Indiana, the
Court held that extended questioning and isolation rendered the de-
fendant's subsequent confession involuntary and inadmissible.37 The
police arrested Watts on suspicion of assault, and later assault and
murder, and interrogated him for five nights, into the early hours of
each morning and intermittently throughout each day as well.38 They
kept him in solitary confinement for the first two days of his incar-
ceration and never took him before a magistrate for a preliminary
hearing, as Indiana law required, or permitted him to contact an at-
torney. 9 Watts eventually confessed and was convicted, but the
Court reversed his conviction, saying that Watts had not confessed
voluntarily.0 "To turn the detention of an accused into a process of
wrenching from him evidence which could not be extorted in open
court," the Court said, "is so grave an abuse of the power of arrest as
to offend the procedural standards of due process."4'
In Watts, there were no fists, ropes or whips, yet the Court still
held that the psychological pressures the police exerted were akin to
physical torture, and thus that the confession was involuntary. Once
again, the Court invoked Star Chamber as an example of the "medie-
val" practices it decried in Brown:
"Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial system.
Such has been the characteristic of Anglo-American criminal justice
since it freed itself from practices borrowed by Star Chamber from
the Continent whereby an accused was interrogated in secret for
hours on end."42
In Culombe v. Connecticut, the Court again used Star Chamber
to symbolize subtle, duplicitous interrogation techniques that were no
less relentless for their softness.43 There, the police in essence killed
35. Id. at 287 (quoting Fisher v. State, 110 So. 361, 365 (Miss. 1926)).
36. Watts, 338 U.S. at 52.
37. Id. at 54.
38. Id. at 52-53.
39. Id. at 53.
40. Id. at 54.
41. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949).
42. Id.
43. 367 U.S. 568, 581-84 (1961).
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the suspect with kindness, yet it was a kindness calculated to wear
him down over time and ultimately to win a confession from him.
Throughout their five-day interrogation, the police bought Culombe
dinners at restaurants." They let him drink liquor." They never beat
him. 6 Instead, they enlisted his wife and thirteen-year-old daughter
to try to convince him to confess.47 They kept him secluded and pre-
vented him from seeing his lawyer. 8 Such techniques, the Court
wrote, were just a more sophisticated version of the "secret inquisi-
tions, sometimes practiced with torture," which characterized interro-
gations in Star Chamber.49 In both cases, the goal was to twist the
body or mind of the suspect until he broke.0
The image of Star Chamber that emerges from Brown, Watts and
Culombe is of a "medieval" court, with all of the incivility, brutality
and crudeness that the moniker "medieval" is meant to evoke. Star
Chamber, according to our Court, used inhuman physical tortures
and unending, secret interrogations to extract confessions from un-
willing defendants. These attributions raise two questions: First, was
Star Chamber in fact inquisitorial; and second, did it employ the kind
of physical and psychological coercion our Court claims?
1.
Our Court has repeatedly associated Star Chamber with inquisi-
torial practices. It is undoubtedly true that in Star Chamber litiga-
tion, the court actively participated in factual investigation. Yet Star
Chamber's version was distinctly adversarial when compared to the
inquisitorial practices used on the Continent, particularly in France,52
and in any case was common in Star Chamber's day.
Star Chamber had two modes of proceeding: the usual proce-
dure, which was long and paper-driven, and the exceptional pro-
ceeding by ore tenus, which was summary. The usual Star Chamber
44. Id. at 608, 616.
45. Id. at 608.
46. Id. at 622-23.
47. Id. at 613.
48. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 609 (1961).
49. Id. at 582.
50. See id. at 584.
51. SCOFIELD, supra note 2, at 75.
52. Morris Ploscowe, The Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedure in Europe
and America, 48 HARV. L. REV. 433, 449 (1935).
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lawsuit began with a formal complaint against the defendant. 3 Once
properly accused, the defendant had eight days in which to consult
counsel, frame an answer, obtain his attorney's signature to the an-
swer, and bring it into the court.54 The defendant was compelled to
answer; a refusal resulted in imprisonment, and (should imprisonment
not coax an answer out of him) eventually a judgment against him.5
Moreover, at the time he filed his answer, he was required to swear to
the truth of the things set forth in his answer, and to his willingness to
answer questions about the charges. 6 From the filing of the defen-
dant's answer, the plaintiff had four days to write interrogatories and
deliver them to an examining judge who then put them to the defen-
dant in private, away from the interruptions of attorneys for either
side.57 If the plaintiff failed to deliver the questions, the defendant
was discharged and the case dismissed." Once the court had in hand
the plaintiff's interrogatories, it would dispatch an examiner to put
those questions to the defendant, under oath, and record his an-
swers-this formed an essential part of the written record upon which
the court would later make its judgment. 9 During this questioning,
"the defendant [could] have no advice of his counsel; neither may he
or his counsel have any sight of the interrogatories to give him any di-
rections."60
Once the examination of the defendant was complete, there were
further rounds of pleadings. 6 The parties then produced their wit-
53. SCOFIELD, supra note 2, at 73.
54. Hudson, supra note 2, at 161. The defendant was entitled to more time if he lived
a great distance from London-an extra day for every 20 miles. SCOFIELD, supra note 2,
at 73; STUCKEY, supra note 6, at 37.
55. SCOFIELD, supra note 2, at 74-75.
56. Hudson says that the answer was brought to the clerk of the court:
who is to give the defendant his oath; which is, that so much of the answer as containeth
his own act and deed, he knoweth to be true; and so much as containeth another man's, he
supposeth to be true; and he sweareth likewise, that he shall make true answers to such
interrogatories as shall be ministered unto him concerning that cause.
Hudson, supra note 2, at 167.
57. Id. at 169-70.
58. Id. at 168-69.
59. Of the interrogatories, Hudson says that in the time of Henry VIII, "the examina-
tions were taken by the lord chancellor in the court, where the interrogatories were never
above six or seven, and those every one a short question." Id.
60. Id.
61. Scofield adds that there was apparently a further possible round-"replication"
and "rejoinder"-but it was rarely used because neither party was permitted, at that stage,
to introduce new issues. SCOFIELD, supra note 2, at 75; see also Selden Society, supra note
4, at xxxiii.
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nesses for the court to examine and the witnesses' answers were
similarly recorded. With this, the written record for the trial was
complete and the court proceeded to a hearing in open court, at
which the written record was read, the attorneys for both sides argued
points of law and, finally, the judges stood one at a time and delivered
their decisions and sentence.62 The ordinary Star Chamber lawsuit
then was paper-driven and time-consuming and, according to one es-
timate, took between two and three years to complete.63 It was in-
quisitorial insofar as the court appointed an examiner to gather facts
from the defendant and both parties' witnesses. Yet it was also dis-
tinctly adversarial: private parties initiated the lawsuit and controlled
the "discovery" process to a significant extent by telling the examiner
whom to question and what questions to ask.
The proceeding by ore tenus was shorter and less complicated,
and involved the Star Chamber judges to a lesser degree.6 This type
of proceeding, which only the King's Attorney-General could insti-
gate, dispensed with the written pleadings and examinations under
oaths.65 However, in order for a case proceeding by ore tenus to reach
judgment and sentencing, the defendant had to freely confess to the
charge, and then affirm his confession in court.66 The initial confes-
sion had to be obtained without oath or compulsion.67 If the defen-
dant denied his confession in court, "although it be subscribed with
his hand, and in the presence of the king's council, which are present
to testify the same," then the court remitted the case to be tried by
the ordinary procedure.68
If there was any procedure that could be abused and turned into
an Inquisition similar to that on the Continent, it was the proceeding
by ore tenus. William Hudson concedes:
[s]ometimes many circumstances are pressed and urged to ag-
gravate the matters which are not confessed by the delinquent;
which surely ought not to be urged, but what he did freely con-
fess in the same manner. And happy were it if these might be
restrained within their limits, for that this course of proceeding
62. SCOFIELD, supra note 2, at 75-76.
63. Thomas G. Barnes, Star Chamber Mythology, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 6 (1961).
64. Hudson, supra note 2, at 126. Hudson describes this procedure as being reserved
for cases of "some growing mischief, which is like to prove dangerous if it be not nipped in
the bud." Id. at 126-27.
65. Barnes, supra note 63, at 6.
66. Id.; Hudson, supra note 2, at 126-27.
67. Hudson, supra note 2, at 127.
68. Id.
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is an exuberancy of prerogative, and therefore great reason to
keep it within the circumference of its own orb.6 9
Hudson's statement thus suggests that Star Chamber's judges did oc-
casionally engage in the unbounded, vigorous fact-gathering that our
Court decries in Brown and Watts.
We should be careful, however, about the conclusions we draw
from this statement. First, it suggests that this type of inquisition was
a departure from Star Chamber's normal procedures.0 Second, it il-
lustrates that contemporary objections to Star Chamber's practices
were more likely due to its departure from its own settled procedures
than to the inquisitorial procedures it ordinarily used. Indeed, Hud-
son calls the practice an "exuberancy of prerogative,"" indicating that
when Star Chamber acted this way, it was instantiating the sover-
eign's prerogative power and not acting as a court. It was likely that
Star Chamber's contemporaries considered this an abuse, for inquisi-
tion was widely practiced without objection at that time in the com-
mon law and ecclesiastic courts.72 Though we may disdain it now, the
inquisitorial method of proceeding was an innovation and an im-
provement upon the older methods of trial by ordeal or compurga-
tory oath.3 It marked a movement towards rational fact-finding in
criminal proceedings. 4 The contentious issues among Seventeenth
Century Britons were whether the inquisition was administered prop-
erly, and whether the procedural prerequisites to its use had been
satisfied, not whether it was appropriate for the court to take part in
finding facts. Star Chamber's procedures may indeed have been in-
quisitorial, but in this regard Star Chamber was unexceptional. It is
unclear, then, why our Court singles Star Chamber out for reproba-
69. Id. at 128.
70. Leonard Levy disagrees. He states, "[T]he Star Chamber might scrap all proce-
dural regularity and do just as it pleased, and it did just that in so-called extraordinary
cases, those involving matters of state and any others deemed by the Star Chamber, in its
prerogative discretion, to be extraordinary." LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT 184 (1986). This is probably an exaggeration. As Hudson notes, Star
Chamber's members included the two Chief Justices of the common law courts (Kings
Bench and Common Pleas), and it acted like any other court for simple reasons of expedi-
ence. Hudson, supra note 2, at 125. Barnes agrees that Star Chamber observed essentially
the same procedure used in the common law courts. Barnes, supra note 63, at 3-4.
71. Hudson, supra note 2, at 127.
72. A. Lawrence Lowell, The Judicial Use of Torture, 11 HARV. L. REV. 290, 294
(1895); Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit. Adversary Procedure in
Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 513-14 (1990).
73. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 273 (John





The Supreme Court has also condemned Star Chamber for its
barbaric methods. It is unsettled whether Star Chamber actually used
or permitted torture to obtain confessions. Hudson refers to the prac-
tice of imprisoning those who refused to answer questions, but he
never mentions torture.75 Stuckey claims that there are no docu-
mented instances of Star Chamber using torture.76 Other commenta-
tors however, state matter-of-factly that Star Chamber used torture to
win confessions from accused heretics." They say that only the King's
Council could authorize torture in a particular instance and that Star
Chamber, as a part of the Council, did just that. Whether Star Cham-
ber used torture or not, it is clear that Star Chamber sentences were
milder than those of the common law courts of its day. The usual
punishment Star Chamber meted out was either fine or imprison-
ment.78 Star Chamber could order corporal punishment in the form of
the pillory, branding or cutting of the nose or ears, but unlike its con-
temporaries, it could not order death or dismemberment.79
When seen against two local lay justices of the peace putting a
country wench to the lash in a market place if she was so unfor-
tunate as to bear an illegitimate child, or against the felon
whose hand has been severed and nailed to the gallows (upon
which he was soon after hanged) for having thrown a stone at
the judge,... Star Chamber's punishments appear somewhat
less barbarous both by reason of incidence and severity.0
It is thus hard to justify the statement that brutality was Star Cham-
ber's chief iniquity or its crowning infamy, at least if the comment re-
fers to contemporary perceptions of Star Chamber.
Even if Star Chamber did use torture to obtain confessions, it
acted no more brutally than the common law courts of its time.8 Tor-
ture was a common pretrial "device" in the common law court of
75. Hudson, supra note 2, at 127.
76. STUCKEY, supra note 6, at 70.
77. LEVY, supra note 70, at 34-35; Ploscowe, supra note 52, at 458.
78. SCOFIELD, supra note 2, at 76.
79. Barnes, supra note 63, at 6-7. This is likely due to the fact that Star Chamber did
not have jurisdiction over treason or other felonies, and those were the only crimes that
carried the harshest sentences. Id. at 7.
80. Id.
81. See id.; Lowell, supra note 71, at 296-97.
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King's Bench in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.82 These
courts employed torture as a pretrial device as a matter of course at
least through Elizabeth's reign (1558-1603) and probably into the
reigns of James (1603-1625) and Charles (1625-1649).83 In fact, the
colonial courts of New England expressly sanctioned torture in cer-
tain circumstances,' and according to one commentator, it was this
brutality that inspired the Fifth Amendment's framers to elevate the
prohibition of compelled self-incrimination to a constitutional protec-
tion.85 Torture in other words, was "prevalent" in that era.
86
The Supreme Court's references to Star Chamber in this context
then, even if accurate, add little to the Court's voluntariness jurispru-
dence that a simple condemnation of ancient practices could not
achieve. There seems to be no reason, other than pedantry, to use
Star Chamber to fill a role equally well-served by more recent and
less obscure examples. If Star Chamber is to stand for something
unique in Supreme Court jurisprudence, therefore, it must be some-
thing other than sheer brutality.
B.
More recently, the Court has used Star Chamber to describe the
scope of the testimonial evidence doctrine in its Self-Incrimination
Privilege jurisprudence. The historical example of Star Chamber
helps to demarcate the boundary between testimonial evidence,
which implicates the Fifth Amendment protection, and non-
testimonial evidence which does not.
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall ... be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."87 The
amendment's text does not identify the ways in which a person might
be made a "witness against himself," but the Court has held that a
person is a witness against himself when he, "testif[ies] against him-
self or otherwise provide[s] the State with evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature."' Put another way, a person is a "witness"
82. Lowell, supra note 71, at 293, 296-97.
83. Id. at 293; Ploscowe, supra note 52, at 458.
84. R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 776 (1935).
85. Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to
Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2651-52 (1996).
86. WIGMORE, supra note 72, at 287 n.89.
87. U.S. CONST. amend V.
88. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990) (internal quotations omitted).
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against himself when he "reveal[s], directly or indirectly, his knowl-
edge of facts relating him to the offense or ... share[s] his thoughts
and beliefs with the Government."8 9 The privilege does not protect a
suspect from being forced to give non-testimonial, or physical, evi-
dence. 9 Thus state officers may collect the latter evidence without
concern for a suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination,9 but they may not "extort" the former."
In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, for example, the Court used a drunken
suspect's slurred words to police to distinguish testimonial from non-
testimonial evidence.93 A police officer arrested Innocencio Muniz
after observing Muniz driving drunk.94 At the police station, officers
asked Muniz a number of questions, including his name, address,
height, weight and eye color.95 They also administered a number of
sobriety tests, and asked him the date of his sixth birthday." Muniz's
verbal responses, which the police videotaped, were confused and his
speech was slurred.' His performance on the sobriety tests was no
better.9" Muniz was convicted of driving under the influence.'
The Supreme Court took Muniz's case to determine whether his
responses to the police officers' questions were testimonial and thus
protected under the Fifth Amendment."° The Court distinguished
between the "delivery and the content" of Muniz's responses, holding
89. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988).
90. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 589; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-63 (1966); Holt
v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910).
91. The officers may not, however, violate the suspect's Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process rights in obtaining evidence. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
92. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910).
93. 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
94. Id. at 585.
95. Id. at 586.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 590. There was no question that Muniz was in custody when the police
asked him these questions, and that the questions were likely to elicit incriminating re-
sponses. Further, the police did not administer Muniz his Miranda warnings until later in
the encounter. Id. at 586. Cf Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966) (holding
that to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the
accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights to remain silent and to
have the assistance of counsel during custodial questioning, among others). Thus, the only
question was whether the Fifth Amendment protected Muniz's responses.
98. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 590.
99. Id. at 587.
100. Id. at 584.
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the former to be non-testimonial and the latter testimonial.' Thus
Muniz's slurring, stumbling and other indices that he lacked muscular
coordination, were admissible against him)0 2 Muniz's answer to the
"sixth birthday question," however, was testimonial and inadmissible
because it relayed a factual assertion.' 3 The content of Muniz's an-
swer communicated to the police a fact that he knew. '
Muniz's response to the "sixth birthday question" was testimo-
nial, the Court concluded, because in the moment before he answered
the question, he faced a "cruel trilemma."' °5 He could remain silent
and incriminate himself by answering that he did not know the date,
or hazard a guess and thereby "lie" about the fact that he did not
know the correct answer."° None of these options was attractive: the
"inherently coercive environment created by the custodial interroga-
tion precluded the option of remaining silent,"'0 7 self-incrimination
carried its own obvious consequences, and lying would have been at
least moral perjury. "At its core," the Court wrote, "the privilege re-
flects our fierce unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to
the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt that de-
fined the operation of the Star Chamber.'
0 8
As the allusion to Star Chamber in Muniz demonstrates, the
Court views Star Chamber as the historical impetus for the Fifth
Amendment's protection against compelled self-incrimination, and
thus it returns to Star Chamber in its effort to describe the privilege's
scope:
This definition of testimonial evidence reflects an awareness of
the historical abuses against which the privilege against self-
incrimination was aimed. Historically, the privilege was in-
tended to prevent the use of legal compulsion to extract from
the accused a sworn communication of facts which would in-
criminate him. Such was the process of... the Star Chamber-
the inquisitorial method of putting the accused upon his oath
and compelling him to answer questions designed to uncover
101. Id. at 592, 598.
102. Id. at 592.
103. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 599.
104. Or in Muniz's case, a fact he didn't know; Muniz was unable to calculate the date
of his sixth birthday. Id.
104. Id. at 597.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 596 (internal quotations omitted).
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uncharged offenses, without evidence from another source.109
The salient aspect of Star Chamber, as the testimonial evidence
doctrine illustrates, appears to be orality. It is the cruel expedient of
making the accused talk about the crimes with which he is charged
that singles out Star Chamber for the Court's scorn. Indeed, the tes-
timonial evidence doctrine is quite narrow: all it prohibits is compel-
ling the accused to make statements, either out loud or in writing,
about his crime." It does not prevent collection of physical evi-
dence,' or even the use of an accused's own statements to other peo-
ple.112
Star Chamber's example, the Court feels, directs that the testi-
monial evidence doctrine be so narrow:
Perhaps the critical historical event shedding light on [the
privilege's] origins and evolution was the trial of one John Lil-
burn, a vocal anti-Stuart Leveller, who was made to take the
Star Chamber Oath in 1637. The oath would have bound him
to answer all questions posed to him on any subject .... On ac-
count of the Lilburn Trial, Parliament abolished the inquisito-
rial Court of Star Chamber and went further in giving him gen-
erous reparation.
1 3
The self-incrimination privilege, in the Court's view, was a reac-
tion to this practice of questioning the accused. Indeed, it was this
practice, the Court intimates, that made Star Chamber hated in its
own day. The privilege's guarantee of silence in the face of ques-
tioning, then, is meant to preclude such interrogations.
Was it really the case Star Chamber's practice of making the ac-
cused speak to the charges against him exercised seventeenth-century
England? The answer is, simply, no. To the contrary, the Court's
concern for orality shows that it fundamentally misunderstands Star
Chamber and the legal context in which it existed. In the seventeenth
century, the accused regularly spoke in his own defense because, at
that time, he was presumed guilty until he proved himself innocent.
He was thus was forced by the operation of the system itself to speak
on his own behalf.
In the centuries leading up to the development of Star Chamber
109. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 595-96 (internal quotations omitted).
110. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 595-97 (1990).
111. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (handwriting); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967) (voice); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765
(1966) (blood).
112. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973).
113. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,458-59.
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as an institution, it had always been the duty of a defendant, once
properly accused, to clear his name."4 A proper accusation was in it-
self considered to be proof of guilt."5 If a properly accused person re-
fused to speak to the charges, his silence was considered a confession
and he was adjudged guilty."6  The defendant did not enjoy a pre-
sumption of innocence until much later, perhaps even as late as the
early nineteenth century. '7 In this context, the accused naturally
spoke in his own defense.
Lilburn's case, to which our Court alludes in Miranda, helps illus-
trate this point. In 1637, John Lilburn was arrested for shipping sedi-
tious books into England, and his case was taken to Star Chamber."'
There was no question as to Lilburn's guilt; his name was on the
manifest accompanying the books."9 For some reason, the King's At-
torney General could not produce a formal complaint against Lilburn
and thus was unable to initiate suit against him."2° Nor could the At-
torney General proceed by ore tenus, because Lilburn would not con-
fess.'2' Without an accuser or a voluntary confession, the prosecution
was stymied. The judges in Star Chamber nonetheless sought to ad-
minister the oath to Lilburn, presumably hoping to elicit sworn testi-
114. WIGMORE, supra note 72, at 284-86. In ancient times, the defendant discharged
this burden either by ordeal or oath. The oath was a declaration of innocence in the form
of an incantation. The incantation was supposed to invoke a supernatural force that itself
acted as an arbiter of truth. If the defendant could repeat the incantation without any mis-
takes or slips of tongue, then this was deemed a message from God that he was innocent
and he was acquitted. This method, Ploscowe says, "would infallibly separate the guilty
from the innocent. If these methods... seem incomprehensible today, it is because the
early faith in the interference of God in human affairs is lost. The religious element per-
meated every method of proof." Ploscowe, supra note 52, at 439. By the end of Star
Chamber's era, the oath by itself was not enough to warrant acquittal. Rather, the defen-
dant swore only to answer truthfully any questions put to him, and the oath acted as a
guarantee of the defendant's veracity. As a 1586 petition to Parliament stated, the oath
"to a conscience that feareth God is more violent then anie racke." LEVY, supra note 70,
at 151. In any case, oaths were commonplace and unobjectionable in themselves. The
primary objections to oaths were based on who could administer them and under what
conditions. WIGMORE, supra note 72, at 272-78. See also, William J. Stuntz, The Substan-
tive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393 (1995).
115. WIGMORE supra note 72, at 284-86; John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1057
(1994).
116. Langbein, supra note 113, at 1057.
117. Id. at 1056-57.
118. LEVY, supra note 70, at 273.
119. Id.
120. WIGMORE, supra note 72, at 274-76.
121. Id.
[Vol. 29:4
mony about the offense upon which they could base a conviction.22
Lilburn refused to swear, insisting that he was not bound to do so un-
til he was properly accused.'23 Lilburn was, of course, correct; in
seeking to administer the oath before properly accusing him, the
judges were attempting to skip the critical first step of a lawsuit.
It is important to understand the function Lilburn's obstinacy
served, for it is easily misunderstood as an objection to giving oral tes-
timony.24 Rather, it was a refusal to assume the burden of defense
without first being properly accused. The accusation was the critical
first step in any case, and a proper accusation functioned to shift the
burden to the defendant to exonerate himself of the offenses charged.
By refusing to take the oath, Lilburn was refusing to permit Star
Chamber to proceed as if that burden had shifted to him when in fact
it had not. Lilburn's own account of the proceedings affirms this in-
terpretation. He said (in response to the Earl of Dorset):
Sir, I know you are not able to prove, and to make that good
which you have said.-I have testimony of it, said he. Then, said
I, produce them in the face of the open court, that we may see
what they have to accuse me of; and I am ready here to answer
for myself, and to make my just defense.-With this he was si-
lent; and said not one more word to me."'
Lilburn's words demonstrate that his objection was not to
speaking in his own defense, but to defending himself prematurely.
Indeed, he was by his own admission willing to take the oath and be
examined if only the court could show that he had been properly ac-
cused: "if I had been proceeded against by a Bill, I would have an-
swered and justified all that they could have proved against me. '
Lilburn objected not to speaking, therefore, but to speaking out of
turn. It was for this reason that Parliament nullified his contempt
conviction, resolving "[t]hat the Sentence of the Star-Chamber given
against John Lilburn is illegal, and against the Liberty of the subject;
and also bloody, cruel, wicked, barbarous, and tyrannical." '27 Lilburn
could not be convicted of contempt for refusing to do what Star
Chamber's judges had no cause to ask of him.
122. John Lilburn, The Trial of John Lilburn and John Wharton, for Printing and Pub-
lishing Seditious Books, in 3 COBBETT's STATE TRIALS 1322-26 (Thomas Bayley Howell,
ed. 1809).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-59 (1966).
125. Lilburn, supra note 120, at 1322.
126. Id. at 1332.
127. Id. at 1342.
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This conclusion is consistent with what we know of criminal pro-
cedure in the common law courts as well. According to John Lang-
bein, the "accused speaks" model of trial, in which the defendant is
compelled to speak in his own defense (by his desire not to be con-
victed automatically), was the norm in England until at least the mid-
dle of the eighteenth century.' It was also common practice in the
American colonies. 9 Eben Moglen argues that America's sparse
population and few professional attorneys or judges necessitated a
more summary form of justice that relied heavily on compelling the
defendant's participation."' Not until the ideas of innocence and a
burden of proof emerged, and the number of lawyers increased, did
the idea of silence in the face of accusation evolve. Yet this was cen-
turies after Star Chamber had been abolished."'
Indeed, antipathy towards compelling the defendant to speak to
the offenses charged, which is today fundamental to our scheme of
liberty, is a comparatively modern concept.' If our Court's com-
plaint, then, is that the practice of "compelling" the accused to speak
in his own defense is what made Star Chamber so despised by the lib-
erty-loving consciences of seventeenth-century Englishmen, the
Court is mistaken. If instead it is that Star Chamber's practices of-
fend our more modern "sense of right and justice," then the charge
amounts to a condemnation of an older system of justice, but not of
Star Chamber specifically.
The Court is thus correct that defendants in Star Chamber spoke
on their own behalf. However, as with the charge of brutality, Star
Chamber was wholly unremarkable in this element of its procedure,
and our Court might as easily find the same symbolism in the colonial
courts of this nation. While there may be reason to applaud the pro-
tections our system now affords accused persons, including the right
to remain silent in the face of accusation, it is clear that Star Cham-
ber's use of the inquisitorial method was just as much an advance-
ment over the primitive ways of its past as our present methods are an
advancement over Star Chamber's.
128. Langbein, supra note 113, at 1048.
129. Pittman, supra note 83, at 775-89.
130. Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086,11.05-11 (1994).
131. Langbein, supra note 113, at 1071.
132. WIGMORE, supra note 72, at 286.
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The third guise in which Star Chamber appears in our Court's ju-
risprudence is as a symbol of political and religious persecution. In
such instances, individual Justices have used Star Chamber to argue
that the Self-Incrimination Clause was meant to protect freedom of
conscience by denying the government access to an individual's
thoughts and beliefs.'33 This is an appropriate use of Star Chamber's
spectre, yet also a very limited one that does not support the majority
of Star Chamber references.
Seventeenth-century Britons resented what they viewed as illegal
extension of the monarchy's prerogative power; in particular its ef-
forts to suppress religious and political dissent, and to impose taxes
without the consent of Parliament. Star Chamber was an integral part
of both endeavors, and thus it became a focal point of resistance to
the monarchy. Star Chamber's close association with the monarchy
and its flexible institutional role made it an ideal instrument, Britons
felt, in the monarchy's attempts to usurp Parliament's powers and
impose absolute royal authority."3 English monarchs had long used
Star Chamber to impose heavy fines on those who displeased the
monarch or committed minor offenses.' This transparent method of
raising money illegally deprived Parliament of its constitutional role
in approving taxes.36 Adding to this injustice, Star Chamber occa-
sionally punished sheriffs who were less than vigorous in collecting
these fines or other taxes."' The monarchy also used Star Chamber as
a forum in which to announce royal decrees. Through these proc-
lamations, the monarchy could effectively legislate without consulting
Parliament. 9 It also used Star Chamber to punish juries who re-
turned verdicts against the Crown in cases in the common law
courts. 140
133. See, e.g., Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405 (1960); Ullmann v. United States, 350
U.S. 422 (1956).
134. SCOFIELD, supra note 2, at 77.
135. James I once fined a theater owner £1000 for hosting a play that was critical of the
Church. Though there was no proof that the theater owner knew of the play's content be-
fore it played, he was fined for not rushing in to stop the play once its disrespectful mes-
sage became apparent. The King also fined the owner's wife, brothers, and all who heard
the play (and applauded). Id. at 47, n.4.
136. Id. at 49.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. SCOFIELD, supra note 2, at 45.
140. Id.
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Star Chamber also became engaged in the monarchy's war on
political and religious dissent. In 1534, Henry VIII united church and
state under his supreme leadership, thereby making "any deviation
from the new religious order a threat to royal supremacy.' 141 "The
expression of dissent blended heresy and treason into indistinguish-
able crimes. Those who continued to support the authority of the
pope, Henry VIII sent to the executioner's chopping block; those who
preached new doctrines he sent to the fires at Smithfield.'
'14 2
Star Chamber was an integral part of this effort. Although it was
not empowered to hear treason cases or to order capital or corporal
punishment,43 it created the crimes of conspiracy, sedition and sub-
version ,14 and it worked with an ecclesiastical body, the High Com-
mission, to prosecute accused heretics as treasonors. 115 Star Chamber
provided a secular forum in which to prosecute the offenses the High
Commission punished, and it was not uncommon for Star Chamber to
attempt prosecution after the High Commission failed.1 6  Though
each monarch after Henry VIII used heresy prosecutions to squelch
political opposition, few (with the possible exception of Elizabeth)
were as determined and ruthless as James I and his successor Charles
1.14 Under Charles, in whose reign Star Chamber was abolished, "the
government embarked on an anti-Puritan policy which, combined
with the personal and arbitrary rule of Charles, embittered great
segments of the nation. ,14' This bitterness, combined with the popu-
lar sentiment that Star Chamber was engaged in the monarchy's at-
tempts to usurp Parliament's powers, ultimately led to its abolition. 9
141. LEVY, supra note 72, at 69.
142. Id.
143. SCOFIELD, supra note 2 at 71; Barnes, supra note 63, at 6-7.
144. Ironically, the common law courts resented Star Chamber for creating these new
crimes, yet they continued to punish those crimes long after Star Chamber's demise.
Thomas G. Barnes, Star Chamber and the Sophistication of the Criminal Law, 1977 CRIM.
L. REV. 316, 317.
145. SCOFIELD, supra note 2, at 48.
146. Id. at 46-47.
147. LEVY, supra note 70, at 266.
148. Id.
149. The Act for the Abolition of the Court of Star Chamber listed several abuses of
which Star Chamber was guilty. Among them were that Star Chamber's judges "have un-
dertaken to punish where no law doth warrant, and to make decrees for things having no
such authority, and to inflict heavier punishments than by any law is warranted ...." 16
CAR. I c. 10 (July 5, 1641) (Eng.). Later that year, Parliament again addressed its reasons
for having abolished Star Chamber. In The Grand Remonstrance, Parliament wrote:
The Court of Star Chamber hath abounded in extravagant censures, not only for
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This suggests that Star Chamber's greatest contribution to the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence may be as a symbol of religious and
political persecution. It was therefore an appropriate allusion in
Kimm v. Rosenberg5 ' and Ullmann v. United States,5' both cases in
which the defendants were punished for their political beliefs. The
defendant in Ullmann, for example, was called before a grand jury
and questioned about his affiliations-and his friends' affiliations-
with the Communist Party.'52 Though the government gave him immu-
nity (in order to compel his testimony), he refused to speak and was
sentenced to 6 months imprisonment for contempt.' A majority of
the Court upheld his sentence, reasoning that the prosecutor's grant
of immunity removed the danger of self-incrimination.'54 Once the
"reason for the privilege ceases," the majority wrote, "the privilege
ceases."1
55
Justices Douglas and Black dissented, arguing that, "[t]he guar-
antee against self-incrimination contained in the Fifth Amendment is
not only a protection against conviction and prosecution but a safe-
guard of conscience and human dignity and freedom of expression as
well.' 5 6 The example of Star Chamber, Douglas wrote, showed that
the Fifth Amendment was meant not only as a protection against
prosecution, but also as an auxiliary to the First Amendment.'57
"Some of those who came to these shores were Puritans who had
known the hated oath ex officio used both by Star Chamber and the
the maintenance and improvement of monopolies and their unlawful taxes, but
for divers other causes where there hath been no offense, or very small; whereby
His Majesty's subjects have been oppressed by grievous fines, imprisonments,
stigmatisings, mutilations, whippings, pillories, gags, confinements, banishments;
after so rigid a manner as hath not only deprived men of the society of their
friends, exercise of their professions, comfort of books, use of paper or ink, hut
even violated that near union which God hath established between men and their
wives, by forced and constrained separation, whereby they have been bereaved
of the comfort and conversation one of another for many years together, without
hope of relief, if God had not by His overruling providence given some interrup-
tion to the prevailing power, and counsel of those who were the authors and
promoters of such peremptory and heady courses.
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 202 (Samuel Rawson
Gardiner, ed. 1906), available at http://www.constitution.org/eng/conpur043.htm.
150. 363 U.S. 405 (1960).
151. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
152. Id. at 425.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 438-39.
155. Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405,439 (1960).
156. Id. at 445.
157. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 445 (1956).
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High Commission. They had known the great rebellion of Lilburn,
Cartwright and others against those instruments of oppression."'' 8 By
preventing the government from forcing an individual to disclose his
private thoughts, the Fifth Amendment effectively prevents the gov-
ernment from criminalizing those thoughts and beliefs. The Fifth
Amendment is thus a procedural mechanism that protects the people
from substantively bad laws. This is the key to understanding Star
Chamber's proper function as an image: Ullmann could only be safe
in his political beliefs if the Fifth Amendment denied the government,
in this case the grand jury, access to them.
Similarly, the defendant in Kimm refused to answer an INS offi-
cer's questions about his Communist Party affiliations during an in-
terview to support his petition for a suspension of deportation pro-
ceedings. 9 Though he apparently met all of the other eligibility
requirements, the INS found that his refusal to answer these ques-
tions impugned his "good moral character" and his petition was de-
nied."6 In a per curiam opinion, a majority of the Court upheld the
agency's decision.' Justice Douglas again dissented, however, writ-
ing that "[i]mputation of guilt for invoking the protection of the Fifth
Amendment carries us back some centuries to the hated ... Star
Chamber."'62 Building on his dissent in Ullmann, Douglas again ad-
vocated for an interpretation of the Fifth Amendment as a protection
of private political beliefs. It is integral to any such protection,
Douglas felt, that an individual not suffer for refusing to discuss his
beliefs.63
The factual similarity between Ullmann and Kimm and the cases
of people like John Lilburn makes the Star Chamber allusion appro-
priate. In both cases, the government had embarked on a crusade to
stamp out political dissent and in both cases the defendants were un-
able to challenge the substance of the laws that made their beliefs
criminal. In both cases, therefore, the defendants resorted to proce-
dural obstructionism to thwart the governments' attempts to prose-
cute them. This parallel did not escape Abe Fortas. In a 1954 speech
to the Cleveland Bar Association, he likened our government's at-
tempts to eradicate communists to seventeenth-century England's ef-
158. Id. at 446.
159. 363 U.S. at 405.
160. Id. at 405-407.
161. Id. at 408.
162. Id. at 410.
163. Id. at 410-11.
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forts to rid itself of heretics. He wrote:
It is exceedingly interesting to note that the clock has come full
circle: that the battleground is again the question whether a
man should be compelled to answer as to his beliefs and affilia-
tions. In the days when the privilege was born, it was a crime to
be a heretic .... Deviation and dissent were considered dan-
gerous to the state, then as now.164
If Star Chamber is an appropriate symbol in cases like Ullmann
and Kimm, it is clearly inappropriate in cases like Muniz or Miranda.
As discussed above, the defendant in Muniz was charged with drunk
driving, and went all the way to the Supreme Court on the issue of
whether the police violated his self-incrimination protections when
they asked him the date of his sixth birthday.' The Court's compari-
son of Muniz's situation to that of suspects in Star Chamber who
"were forced to choose between revealing incriminating private
thoughts and forsaking their oath by committing perjury ' ' 61 is strained
at best. While Muniz's knowledge of a particular date may certainly
be a fact, there can be no serious analogy between Lilburn's 'private
thoughts' about his religion and politics, and Muniz's 'private
thoughts' about his birthday. Indeed, to whatever extent Muniz's
case bothers us it is not because we feel that the government has no
business punishing drunk driving. The right to silence here is not
acting as a proxy for resistance to substantively bad laws, and thus
Star Chamber is an inappropriate image.
The same is true of Ernesto Miranda, who was convicted of kid-
napping and rape.'67 We would hardly call his prosecution "persecu-
tion," yet again the Court raised the spectre of Star Chamber in its
decision holding that Miranda's confession was obtained in violation
of his Fifth Amendment rights.' 68 Whatever the merits of Miranda's
constitutional claim, there can be no serious argument that his "pri-
vate thoughts" about his crimes were deeply held or religious beliefs
of the type that were at issue in Lilburne's case. His objection was
not an unspoken protest against the substance of the statutes that
made kidnapping and rape criminal, it was a purely procedural objec-
tion to the manner in which the police obtained his confession. The
Court's references to Star Chamber here, as in Muniz, seem to lack
164. Abe Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25 CLEV. B.
ASS'N J. 95, 101 (1954).
164. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 595-600 (1990).
166. Id. at 596.
167. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,492 (1966).
168. Id.
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the high purpose and significance they have in cases like Ullmann and
Kimm. They seem to utilize less of Star Chamber's power as a sym-
bol of the dangers of religious persecution, and rely more instead on
myths about its cruelty.
IV.
The Supreme Court has used the spectre of Star Chamber to de-
velop several themes in its self-incrimination jurisprudence: brutality,
inquisition, the danger of making the accused talk about the charges
against him, and the wickedness of official ideology. A closer exami-
nation of Star Chamber and the historical and legal context in which
it existed show that our Court sometimes misunderstands Star Cham-
ber. Star Chamber may well have employed more brutal and inquisi-
torial procedures than are acceptable in our current system, but it was
unexceptional in this regard. Indeed, its only distinguishing feature is
that fewer people are familiar with Star Chamber than are familiar
with our own colonial courts, reference to which could serve the
Court's purpose equally well. The same is true of Star Chamber's
practice of requiring the accused to speak in his own defense. It is
only as an example of suppression of political and religious dissent
that references to Star Chamber make a unique contribution to Su-
preme Court jurisprudence. In this context, Star Chamber stands out
as an enduring symbol of state power employed to enforce conformity
in matters of belief, and a warning to governments of the danger of
institutionalizing ideology.
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